

CORRELATES OF PUBLIC SENTIMENTS ABOUT WAR:
LOCAL REFERENDA ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE

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Political science, by whatever definition of the discipline one might want to adopt, traditionally has been concerned with public opinion and participation on significant policy questions. Although the literature has become too vast for a complete enumeration of the varied contexts in which this research has been conducted, one issue that might rank high on a list of priorities for study—and yet has received somewhat less emphasis than other topics—is the subject of public attitudes toward war.

Perhaps this relative neglect has been promoted by a lack of opportunities for direct public participation in foreign policy decisions. Unlike most domestic issues, controversies over world problems have been relatively insulated from popular influence. Hence, research on the development of international conflict usually has devoted more attention to the statements and behavior of national leaders or key influentials than to public sentiments regarding war.¹

In recent years, however, the bitter debate generated by the war in Vietnam has stimulated mounting interest in popular attitudes concerning military action.² The controversy has provoked both an unusual display of public disagreement about the war and a desire for basic changes in the policy-making process. Many persons not only have registered strong disapproval of American involvement in the Vietnam war, but they also have expressed an acute sense of frustration about their inability to affect the

conduct of international relations. As a result, growing demands have emerged to permit expanded public access to critical decisions and to create increasingly democratic methods of formulating foreign policy.

The probable outcome of enhanced public participation in framing foreign policy decisions, however, has been difficult to assess. Since voters seldom have been able to exert a direct influence on foreign affairs, government officials—as well as anti-war leaders—have not been able to determine whether increased opportunities for the expression of public sentiments about international problems would produce demands for more conciliatory or more militaristic policies. As Robinson and Jacobson reported after a thorough summary of existing data on the Vietnam issue, "In spite of increasing inquiry and speculation about the psychological basis of war, we have few theories and fewer empirical studies of public support for any war—let alone the war in Vietnam."³

Perhaps one of the most perplexing problems in the analysis of public opinion on war has been a lack of clarity concerning the foreign policy attitudes of persons at different socioeconomic levels. Early research suggested that variables such as party or group influences and affiliations were more important than social class in determining foreign policy attitudes.⁴ In addition, studies of voting behavior indicated that, in contrast to voters whose interest in foreign policy outweighed their interest in domestic problems, there was an increased prevalence of "status voting" among persons who were more concerned about domestic than foreign policy issues.⁵ A careful investigation of survey data col-

¹ See, however, Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

² See, for example, William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Summer 1966), 187-199; William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and Donald Koenig, "A Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion on U. S. Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Summer 1967), 242-252. A comprehensive review of the literature relating to public opinion on issues of war and peace has been prepared by William Eckhardt and Theo. F. Lenz, "Factors of War/Peace Attitudes," *Peace Research Reviews*, 1 (October 1967), 1-114.

³ John P. Robinson and Solomon G. Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About Vietnam," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, 10 (1968), 75.

⁴ George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter 1951-52), 601-623.

⁵ Philip E. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior," in Eleanor F. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 396-

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⁶ Milton J. Rosenbaum,
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⁷ Sidney Verba, Richard
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⁸ Robinson and Jacobson
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⁹ Richard F. Hamilton,
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¹⁰ Martin Patchen,
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of enhanced public foreign policy decisions, to assess. Since voters exert a direct influence on government officials—as have not been able to used opportunities for sentiments about international demands for militaristic policies. reported after a long data on the Vietnam increasing inquiry and biological basis of war, fewer empirical studies war—let alone the war

perplexing problems on war has been the foreign policy different socioeconomic tested that variables and affiliations social class in determinations.⁴ In addition, indicated that, in contrast in foreign policy domestic problems. prevalence of "status no were more consistent foreign policy issue of survey data col-

olomon G. Jacobson, "About Vietnam," *Peace and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 10 (1968).

Campbell, "Political Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter 1951-52), 1-15.

Shifting Role of Class Behavior," in Eleanor E. Schattschneider, and Eugene I. Schattschneider, *Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 396-400.

lected since World War II concluded that, in comparison with other attributes, "the social class variable seems to be less clearly and less strongly related to attitudes on Cold-War issues."⁶

The association between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward the Vietnam war also has not been particularly clear. A major national survey of public opinion on the war in Vietnam, for example, reported that policy preferences on the Vietnam issue were not significantly related to accepted measures of social class such as income, education, and occupation.⁷ Subsequent data analyses, however, have indicated that "differences by social status and age . . . seem more visible, with those of higher status and middle age most in favor of war policies."⁸ In addition, two other national studies found that lower-class persons were more likely than middle- or upper-status respondents to support "moderate" or "conciliatory" policies in both the Vietnam and Korean conflict⁹ as well as to favor a de-escalation of the Vietnam war.¹⁰

Despite the latter evidence, many observers adopted the conventional belief that working-class segments of the population have failed to express strong opposition to the Vietnam war. The report prepared by Jerome Skolnick for the National Commission on the Causes and Pre-

397; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 361.

*Milton J. Rosenberg, "Images in Relation to the Policy Process: American Public Opinion on Cold-War Issues," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 317.

*Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," this REVIEW, 61 (June 1967), 317-333.

*Robinson and Jacobson, "American Public Opinion About Vietnam," 67.

*Richard F. Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (June 1968), 439-445; Richard F. Hamilton, "Le Fondement Populaire des Solutions Militaires 'Dures': Le Cas de la Chine en 1952," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 10 (1969), 37-58.

*Martin Patchen, "Social Class and Foreign Policy Attitudes," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California, September, 1969.

vention of Violence concluded that, for a variety of reasons, "rank-and-file American workingmen have not supported the peace movement."¹¹ The failure of working-class voters to make a conspicuous or major contribution to the anti-war protest movement, however, might not have reflected the actual distribution of public attitudes about the Vietnam issue. In fact, participation in mass demonstrations may have provided a less accurate measure of popular sources of support or opposition concerning the war than survey responses or voting behavior.¹²

Perhaps a major weakness of prior studies of public sentiments about war and peace has resulted from the relatively remote character of those controversies. Perceptions of complicated international issues often have been affected by feelings of patriotism and by the statements of respected national leaders.¹³ In addition, investigations of foreign policy attitudes seldom have been linked to specific acts of political behavior or participation. Since many respondents may have become aware that their opinions will have less impact on international than on domestic issues, perhaps their replies have been shaped by special influences or constraints that have not affected policy preferences on other issues. Increased opportunities for direct popular participation in the development of foreign policy, therefore, could have a major effect on public attitudes toward war.

Perhaps the only means by which rank-and-file citizens can influence military actions directly, however, is through a popular referendum. In fact, this proposal was nearly adopted by Congress in 1937. The so-called "Ludlow Amendment," which would have granted the electorate "sole power by a national referendum to declare war or to engage in warfare overseas," was rejected in the House of Representatives by

*Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 58.

*The 1968 elections study conducted by the Survey Research Center indicated that white opposition to the Vietnam war was associated with disapproval rather than approval of anti-war demonstrations. See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," this REVIEW, 63 (December 1969), 1087-1088.

*Eugene J. Rosi, "Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear Weapons Tests and Fallout, 1954-1963," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Summer 1965), 280-297; S. Putney and R. Middleton, "Student Acceptance or Rejection of War," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (October 1962), 655-666.

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21 votes through intense pressure from the Roosevelt administration after national polls had revealed that almost three-fourths of the American people favored the legislation.¹⁴ Although the sponsor of the amendment, Representative Louis Ludlow (D-Ind.), argued that referendum was "the only way a question of such transcendent importance should be decided," the opportunity for the public to vote directly on issues of war and peace did not become widely available in this country for another thirty years.

At the height of the Vietnam controversy, several American communities held referenda on the war to permit residents to express their sentiments about this issue. As an unusual and specific context for the assessment of public attitudes toward war, the votes offered an important means of identifying segments of the population that might support or oppose military action abroad.

Although numerous studies have examined referenda on such diverse topics as fluoridation,¹⁵ school bonds,¹⁶ metropolitan government,¹⁷ and civil rights controversies,¹⁸ researchers usu-

¹⁴ Richard Dean Burns and W. Addams Dixon, "Foreign Policy and the 'Democratic Myth': The Debate on the Ludlow Amendment," *Mid-America*, 47 (October 1965), 288-306.

¹⁵ Thomas F. A. Plaut, "Analysis of Voting Behavior on a Fluoridation Referendum," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (Summer 1959), 213-233; Harlan Hahn, "Voting Behavior on Fluoridation Referendums: A Re-evaluation," *The Journal of the American Dental Association*, 71 (November 1965), 1138-1144.

¹⁶ Richard F. Carter and William G. Savard, *Influence of Voter Turnout on School Bond and Tax Elections*, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Cooperative Research Monograph No. 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961).

¹⁷ James A. Norton, "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (March 1963), 195-212; Richard A. Watson and John H. Romani, "Metropolitan Government for Metropolitan Cleveland: An Analysis of the Voting Record," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5 (November 1961), 365-390.

¹⁸ Norman I. Lustig, "The Relationship Between Demographic Characteristics and Pro-Integration Vote of White Precincts in a Metropolitan Southern County," *Social Forces*, 40 (March 1962), 205-208; James W. Vander Zanden, "Voting on Segregationist Referenda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring 1961), 92-105; Harlan Hahn, "Northern Referenda on Fair Housing: The Response of

ally have been compelled to investigate voting behavior on foreign policy issues in candidate elections rather than directly in referenda. One study of referendum voting derived from Hofstadter's distinction between the political ethos of "Yankee" and "immigrant" voters, however, alleged that upper class citizens were more likely to favor "public-regarding" proposals or measures justified by "the public interest" than lower-class residents.¹⁹ Subsequent research has suggested that this phenomenon might be more closely related to socioeconomic than to ethnic characteristics²⁰ and that the concept of "public-regardingness" may have other limitations.²¹ Yet, Hofstadter's original description of the upper- and middle-class ethos as denoting a belief that public policy should be developed "in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs" while the lower-class ethos "took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs"²² seemed to contain some useful implications for the study of foreign policy attitudes. The referenda concerning the Vietnam war thus provided a rare opportunity to explore this speculation by investigating voting behavior on foreign policy issues.

I. COMMUNITY REFERENDA ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Between 1966 and 1968, at least seven cities in the United States—Dearborn, Michigan; San Francisco, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Madison, Wisconsin; Mill Valley, California; Lincoln, Massachusetts; and Beverly Hills, California—held local referenda on the Vietnam war.²³ Election returns and comparable census

White Voters," *Western Political Quarterly*, 21 (September 1968), 483-495; Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting," this REVIEW, 62 (September 1968), 753-769.

¹⁹ James Q. Wilson, and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December 1964), 876-887.

²⁰ Harlan Hahn, "Ethos and Social Class: Referenda in Canadian Cities," *Polity*, 2 (Spring 1970), 295-315.

²¹ Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June 1966), 306-326.

²² Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 9.

²³ For a description of the Cambridge referendum, see Victoria Bonnell and Chester Hartman, "Cambridge Votes on the Vietnam War," *Dissent*, 15 (March-April 1968), 103-106. For an account of

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By focusing on referendum votes, to investigate reactions to the Vietnam behavior cannot, or from ecological voting data at least the characteristics that were related to American participation. In this study, supplement and

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²⁴ Census tract, 1960 or Mill Valley, this study were distinct boundaries, including precinct voting census districts, description of the and Social Class, conducting an extended Public Health Service referendum voting in cities employing tract data.

²⁵ Austin Ranney, "The Behavior of Aggregate Data," in Austin Ranney, *Behavioral Study of* Illinois Press, 1962.

²⁶ W. S. Robinson, "The Behavior of Social Review, 15 (1961), 1-10." "Comment on Robinson and the Behavior of Social Review, 15 (1961), 1-10."

²⁷ This study was voting patterns of the electorate and in different social areas, or individuals, see Robert J. Havighill, *Social Areas by Census* California Publications in Social Science, 4 (1961), 1-10.

tract data were obtained within each of the communities, except Lincoln and Mill Valley, to provide a basis for the examination of referendum voting on the war in Vietnam.²⁴

By focusing on the comparative study of referendum votes, this research will attempt both to investigate recurrent voting patterns and to assess the responses of separate local electorates to the Vietnam issue.²⁵ Although individual behavior cannot, of course, be precisely inferred from ecological correlations,²⁶ the analysis of voting data at least permits the identification of the characteristics of segments of communities that were related to voter preferences concerning American participation in the Vietnam war.²⁷ In this study, survey data also will be used to supplement and verify the correlates of opposi-

tion to the war disclosed by referendum voting behavior.

In addition to the unusual opportunities that the referenda offered for direct public participation in foreign policy decisions, the voting may have been partially shielded from the conventional influence of national loyalties that often shape public attitudes on international issues.²⁸ As a logical extension of democratic procedures, referenda probably have evoked a relatively useful and accurate expression of voter preferences regarding the war in Vietnam.²⁹

Furthermore, the referenda afforded a rare occasion to examine the distribution of sentiments on the Vietnam war within specific local areas that normally cannot be adequately sampled in national surveys. Since the characteristics of cities that held referenda on Vietnam policy differed appreciably, this study also has sought to explore the effects of local traditions and social structure on the correlates of public attitudes regarding a major political controversy.

Although the referendum results recorded slightly greater support for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam than concurrent national surveys,³⁰ the vote against the war in five cities between 1966 and early 1968 differed by no more than four percent. At the mid-term elections of 1966, 41 percent of the votes cast in Dearborn, Michigan endorsed a ballot proposition that was similar to the question used by university-sponsored surveys in asking, "Are you in favor of an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam so that the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems?" In municipal elections one year later, 39 percent of the voters in Cambridge favored "the prompt return home of American soldiers from Vietnam" and approximately 40 percent approved a similar proposal

²⁸ Vander Zaden has noted that "since voting does take place secretly and privately—not publicly, where other social concerns, pressures, or considerations might intervene—it may be quite indicative of private sentiments." Vander Zaden, "Voting on Segregationist Referenda," 103.

²⁹ Perhaps referenda also have given citizens an increased opportunity to project their personal sentiments about the war in their votes rather than asking them to respond to the specific alternatives posed by an interviewer, which usually have focused on the international rather than the personal implications of foreign policy proposals.

³⁰ Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest*, p. 44; Robinson and Jacobson, "American Public Opinion about Vietnam," 71-72.

the first Dearborn referendum, see Harlan Hahn and Albert Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," *War/Peace Report*, 11 (May 1967), 14-15.

²⁴ Census tract data were not available for Lincoln or Mill Valley. Data for the other cities in this study were prepared by superimposing precinct boundaries on tract maps and reaggregating precinct voting statistics so that election and census districts were comparable. For a further description of this procedure, see Hahn, "Ethos and Social Class," 299. The author currently is conducting an extension study supported by U. S. Public Health Service grant No. DH 00151 of referendum voting behavior in approximately 60 U. S. cities employing social and economic variables obtained from city block statistics rather than from tract data.

²⁵ Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 99-100.

²⁶ W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 351-357; Herbert Menzel, "Comment on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,'" *American Sociological Review*, 15 (1950), 674-675.

²⁷ This study will attempt to compare not only voting patterns between cities but also the sentiments of relatively high or low status segments of the electorate both within the same community and in different communities. For a statement about the utility of focusing upon the study of social areas, or census tracts, rather than individuals, see Robert C. Tryon, "Identification of Social Areas by Cluster Analysis," *University of California Publications in Psychology*, 8 (August 1955), 4.

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in San Francisco. Similarly, opposition to "the continued United States prosecution" of the Vietnam war in February, 1968 in Lincoln, Massachusetts was recorded at 39 percent. On April 2, in the Wisconsin primary 43 percent of the voters in Madison approved a proposal for "an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam."

One week later, and ten days after President Johnson's dramatic decision to limit the bombing of North Vietnam, the trend of the public opinion seemed to shift slightly as two California communities—Beverly Hills and Mill Valley—passed anti-war resolutions by identical margins of 56 percent. A virtual replication of the Dearborn referendum in November, 1968 also resulted in the approval of a proposal for unilateral withdrawal by 57 percent of the voters in that community. While the votes held after the Wisconsin primary reflected somewhat greater opposition to the war than the elections held before then, the results of separate referenda during both periods seemed to be essentially similar.

II. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

The referendum voting returns permitted a comparative investigation of public sources of support or opposition concerning American participation in the Vietnam war. The Pearsonian product-moment coefficients of correlation between conventional measures of socioeconomic status such as income, education, and occupation and the percentage of the vote against American participation in the Vietnam war in six referenda are presented in Table 1.³¹

Perhaps most striking relation shown in Table 1 is the strong *inverse* association between opposition to the Vietnam war and increasing socioeconomic status. Disapproval of the war appeared to be related to working-class rather than to high-status characteristics. In most communities, as the proportion of voters possessing relatively low-status attributes grew, the vote against the Vietnam war also tended to mount.

The voting, however, did reveal some of the

unique features of each locality. In Dearborn and San Francisco, for example, the percentage of persons earning an annual income of less than \$7,000 was directly related to the vote against the war, while the proportion earning wages higher than that figure was negatively associated with anti-war voting; but, in the exceedingly affluent environs of Beverly Hills, the correlations did not reveal an inverse association between income and opposition to the war until the salary level of \$15,000 was reached. On the other hand, in Madison, voting for the withdrawal of American troops was directly related only to the percentage of people receiving wages of less than \$5,000 annually; and it was inversely related to the proportions earning larger sums.³² The association between educational attainments and the vote against the Vietnam war in Beverly Hills was inverse only for the variable measuring college attendance; but in Dearborn this relationship was inverse for the percentage of people that completed high school, and in San Francisco it was negatively related to all groups that had gone beyond the eighth grade. Comparable patterns were evident in the associations between occupational characteristics and the vote in Dearborn, San Francisco, and Beverly Hills. Relative to the aggregate socioeconomic level of most communities, therefore, the data indicated that attributes signifying lower social status were related to increasing opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Perhaps the clearest exception to this generalization, however, was the referendum vote in Cambridge. In that municipality, opposition to the war was directly related to the proportion of persons earning incomes of \$10,000 or more annually, the college-educated, and professional or managerial employees; but it was inversely associated with the percentage of people exhibiting lower educational, salary, or occupational attainments. In part, this pattern may have been produced by unique features of the Cambridge referendum campaign which, after a bitter struggle with a Progressive Labor Party group that circulated a counter-petition condemning the war for exploiting American workers, was conducted and led by what two participant-observers called "a middle-class, university-oriented" organization that virtually ignored working-class neighborhoods. Despite this neglect, the observers concluded, "Support for the referendum was lower than anticipated in the predominantly upper-income university sections but substantially

³¹ Although the variables or categories of income, education, and occupation are both inter-related and ipsative—that is, the proportion of persons at one level will affect the percentage at another level, they are not mirror images of each other. Consequently, all of the classifications have been reported both to indicate the patterns or the thresholds reflected by the correlations and to provide a more complete picture of the associations between socioeconomic status and the vote on Vietnam policy than would be possible through the use of summary measures.

³² The mean vote against the Vietnam war in Madison ranged from 59 percent in tracts with a median income below \$4,000 to 37 percent in tracts where the median income was \$8,000 or more.

TABLE 1. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

Income:
Percent of population less than \$5,000 annually
Percent of population \$5,000–\$6,999 annually
Percent of population \$10,000–\$14,999 annually
Percent of population more than \$15,000 annually

Education:
Percent of population years of schooling
Percent of population 9–11 years of schooling
Percent of population high school degree
Percent of population college education

Occupation:
Percent of population in professional or jobs
Percent of population in clerical or sales
Percent of population as craftsmen or
Percent of population as operatives or
Percent of population unemployed

* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
*** significant at .001 level

higher than anticipated." In addition, political controversy in this city long have been a "cleavage" between those of 'Old Cambridge' who live primarily in the city and those in the suburbs.

³³ Bonnell and Hahn, "The Vietnam War," p. 1142.

³⁴ Hahn, "Voting referenda," p. 1142.

TABLE 1. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR
BY CENSUS TRACT IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N = 18)	Dearborn (1968) (N = 18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N = 5)	San Francisco (1967) (N = 122)	Madison (1968) (N = 27)	Cambridge (1967) (N = 30)
<i>Income:</i>						
Percent of population earning less than \$5,000 annually	+ .83***	+ .82***	+ .70	+ .39***	+ .57***	-.27
Percent of population earning \$5,000-\$6,999 annually	+ .66***	+ .78***	+ .74	+ .19*	-.06	-.59***
Percent of population earning \$10,000-\$14,999 annually	-.81***	-.85***	+ .53	-.44***	-.41*	+ .37*
Percent of population earning more than \$15,000 annually	-.50*	-.64**	-.67	-.30***	-.19	+ .54***
<i>Education:</i>						
Percent of population with 8 years of schooling or less	+ .79***	+ .81***	+ .40	+ .24**	+ .00	-.71***
Percent of population with 9-11 years of schooling	+ .53*	+ .68***	+ .80	-.03	-.13	-.74***
Percent of population with high school degrees	-.45*	-.34	+ .53	-.38***	-.30	-.55***
Percent of population with college education	-.65**	-.78***	-.75	-.18*	-.24	+ .81***
<i>Occupation:</i>						
Percent of population employed in professional or managerial jobs	-.66***	-.80***	-.63	-.30***	+ .00	+ .76***
Percent of population employed in clerical or sales jobs	-.66***	-.68***	+ .73	-.22**	-.14	-.14
Percent of population employed as craftsmen or foremen	+ .11	+ .28	+ .43	-.11	-.38*	-.44**
Percent of population employed as operatives or laborers	+ .71***	+ .81***	+ .23	+ .16*	-.13	-.70***
Percent of population unemployed	+ .51*	+ .40*	+ .75	+ .39***	+ .44**	-.44**

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

higher than anticipated in the working-class districts."³³ In addition, voting patterns on other political controversies and referendum issues in this city long have been influenced by a traditional "cleavage between the 'Yankee' residents of 'Old Cambridge' and the Irish and Italians who live primarily in 'East Cambridge.'"³⁴ The peculiar circumstances surrounding the referen-

dum campaign in Cambridge as well as local social animosities, therefore, probably contributed to the marked differences between the socioeconomic correlates of the vote there and the patterns uncovered in other cities.

Although the findings from the other major university community of Madison also were somewhat unclear, the data revealed few other contrasts between voter preferences in large cities such as San Francisco and suburban communities such as Dearborn and Beverly Hills or between the periods in which the referenda were held. The social and economic sources of opposi-

³³ Bonnell and Hartman, "Cambridge Votes on the Vietnam War," 105-106.

³⁴ Hahn, "Voting Behavior on Fluoridation Referendums," 1142.

tion to the Vietnam conflict in 1966 or 1967, when criticism of the war was limited, did not seem to differ appreciably from those reflected in the referenda of 1968, by which time hostility to the war had broadened and intensified. In fact, the nearly identical referenda held in Dearborn in 1966 and 1968, respectively, seemed to indicate no major changes in the distribution of attitudes or voting patterns on the Vietnam issue, except that the associations between lower-class attributes and sentiments favoring an end to the Vietnam war seemed to increase, while the corresponding relationships between high-status indicators and support for the war also were enhanced.

The socioeconomic discrepancies between supporters and opponents of the war reflected in referendum voting also were confirmed by survey data. The Gallup Poll found, for example, that high income and well educated respondents were most likely to describe their attitudes toward the Vietnam war as "hawkish," while a large proportion of persons with grade school educations chose the designation "doves."³⁵ Manual workers also expressed stronger support for both the immediate and the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam than persons in business or professional occupations.³⁶ Moreover, investigations of a 1966 survey of 406 adults in Detroit using the concept of "social position" developed by Galtung³⁷ revealed that both support for a de-escalation of the Vietnam war and the desire to participate in a referendum on Vietnam policy were inversely related to increasing social positions.³⁸

While the findings seemed to contradict much popular speculation about the alleged resistance of working-class voters to the anti-war move-

ment, they did not appear to be inconsistent with some appraisals of the social and economic effects of war. In general, young men from high income families are less likely to be drafted than low status males.³⁹ Other statistics have indicated that a disproportionate number of youths from low socioeconomic origins and minority groups are assigned to Vietnam, and those soldiers may have suffered increased casualties.⁴⁰ In many lower-class homes, the actual or threatened loss of a son perhaps has implied economic hardship as well as personal tragedy; and more working-class than high-status families apparently have been exposed to this risk. The Vietnam war probably has had a particular impact on lower-class voters that affected the preferences on the issue they expressed at the ballot box.

III. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Since family interests, especially in homes that contain draft-age sons, may have had an important effect on public attitudes toward the Vietnam war, variables that reflected the age, ethnic, social, or economic attributes of families were related to referendum voting behavior. The coefficients of correlation between selected household characteristics and the vote in opposition to the Vietnam war are contained in Table 2.

The referenda tended to confirm the findings of earlier surveys that a relatively strong "predictor of attitudes toward Vietnam policy was race."⁴¹ Although the proportions of black residents in Dearborn and Beverly Hills were so small as to make the correlations virtually meaningless,⁴² race was associated with opposition to the war in Madison and Cambridge, where black voters comprised a small segment of the community, and in San Francisco, which contained a sizeable black population.

³⁵ *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 40 (October 1968), 25.

³⁶ *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 49 (July 1969), 10-11; "Americans on the War: Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Wait," *Time*, 94 (October 31, 1969), 13-15. In May, 1970, blue collar workers lacking a high school education apparently expressed strong opposition to President Nixon's action in Cambodia. "A Newsweek Poll: Mr. Nixon Holds Up," *Newsweek*, 75 (May 25, 1970), 30.

³⁷ Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1 (1964), 206-231; Johan Galtung, "Social Position, Party Identification and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Norwegian Case Study," in Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, 161-193.

³⁸ Harlan Hahn, "Dove Sentiments Among Blue-Collar Workers," *Dissent*, 17 (May-June, 1970), 202-205.

³⁹ James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "Selective Service and Military Manpower: Induction and Deferment Policies in the 1960's," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 83-121.

⁴⁰ "Negroes and Military Service—Latest Facts," *U. S. News and World Report* (August 15, 1966); see also Ralph Guzman, "Mexican-American Casualties in Vietnam," unpublished paper, Merrill College, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1969.

⁴¹ Verba, et al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," 325.

⁴² In Dearborn and Beverly Hills, however, the percentage of foreign-born residents was closely related to the vote against American participation in the war.

TABLE 2.
AND

Children in Home
Percent of household
children under 18
Percent of male
10-19 years
Percent of male
15-24 years

Age of Males:
Percent of male
20-34 years
Percent of male
35-44 years
Percent of male
45-59 years
Percent of male
60 years of age

Ethnicity:
Percent of population
nonwhite
Percent of population
foreign born

Home Ownership:
Percent of owner-occupied
dwelling units
Percent of homes
at less than \$10,000
Percent of homes
at \$10,000-\$20,000
Percent of homes
at \$20,000-\$30,000
Percent of homes
at more than \$30,000

Average Monthly Income:
Percent of residents
for less than \$60
Percent of residents
for \$60-\$99
Percent of residents
for \$100-\$149
Percent of residents
for more than \$149

* significant

** significant

*** significant

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTED HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR BY CENSUS TRACT
IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N=18)	Dearborn (1968) (N=18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N=5)	San Francisco (1967) (N=122)	Madison (1968) (N=27)	Cambridge (1967) (N=30)
<i>Children in Households:</i>						
Percent of households containing children under 18 years of age	-.60**	-.56**	-.33	+.22**	-.77***	-.63***
Percent of males aged 10-19 years	-.80***	-.82***	-.62	+.05	+.48**	-.23
Percent of males aged 15-24 years	+.23	+.23	-.84*	-.09	-.54**	-.37*
<i>Age of Males:</i>						
Percent of males aged 20-34 years	+.76***	+.83***	+.62	+.37***	+.63***	+.53***
Percent of males aged 35-44 years	-.75***	-.73***	+.01	+.20*	-.68***	-.46**
Percent of males aged 45-59 years	-.26	-.35	-.82*	-.43***	-.23	-.16
Percent of males over 60 years of age	+.81***	+.72***	+.25	-.35***	+.11	+.13
<i>Ethnicity:</i>						
Percent of population nonwhite	+.25	+.11	-.57	+.65***	+.21	+.15
Percent of population foreign born	+.81***	+.79***	+.98**	-.16*	+.34*	-.67***
<i>Home Ownership or Value:</i>						
Percent of owner occupied dwelling units	-.80***	-.67***	-.44	-.30***	-.70***	-.32*
Percent of homes valued at less than \$10,000	+.67***	+.74***	+.14	+.19*	+.58***	-.58***
Percent of homes valued at \$10,000-\$19,999	-.06	+.07	+.58	+.18*	+.05	-.26
Percent of homes valued at \$20,000-\$25,000	-.51*	-.64**	+.96**	-.05	-.27	+.51**
Percent of homes valued at more than \$25,000	-.41	-.54**	-.96**	-.19*	-.14	+.66***
<i>Average Monthly Rent:</i>						
Percent of residents renting for less than \$60	+.68***	+.58**	+.34	+.36***	+.64***	-.37*
Percent of residents renting for \$60-\$99	+.64**	+.70***	+.61	+.01	+.29	-.36*
Percent of residents renting for \$100-\$149	-.80***	-.77***	+.52	-.37***	-.33*	+.64***
Percent of residents renting for more than \$150	-.56**	-.64**	-.51	-.26**	-.44*	+.50**

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

In addition, the data on household characteristics seemed to underscore the influence of socioeconomic attributes on referendum voting. In all cities, for example, renters apparently expressed greater opposition to the Vietnam war than homeowners. Furthermore, lower house values and rents were directly associated with the vote against the war in four of the cities; but more expensive homes and rents were inversely related to the protest vote. Generally, differences in the associations with the vote began to appear as house values approached \$10,000 and as average monthly rents neared \$100, except in the high-status community of Beverly Hills, where the signs of the correlations changed markedly at the levels of more than \$25,000 for home values and of \$150 or more for mean monthly rent. Although the relationships between the vote on the Vietnam war and both the value of dwelling units and average monthly rent in Cambridge again were inconsistent with the associations found elsewhere, in the remaining cities opposition to the war was related to such working-class attributes as an annual income below \$5,000, less than 8 years of schooling, unskilled occupations, unemployment, low home ownership, house values below \$10,000, and monthly rents of \$100 or less.

Family characteristics, however, seemed to be more closely related to opposition to the Vietnam war than might have been expected. In fact, the proportion of households containing children under 18 years of age was inversely related to the vote against the war in all cities except San Francisco. Moreover, the percentage of young men between 10 and 19 years old, or approaching draft age, was negatively associated with disapproval of the war in the Dearborn, Beverly Hills, and Cambridge referenda. In Beverly Hills, even the proportion of men in a prime category of draft eligibility, aged 15-24 years, was inversely related to the vote in opposition to the war; and it was significantly correlated with voting behavior only in Madison and Beverly Hills. Variables reflecting the age of children, therefore, did not seem to yield particularly strong or consistent associations with positions on the Vietnam war.

The inverse associations between the vote against the war and the proportion of young men as well as middle-aged parents seemed to be inconsistent with the apparent interests of those segments of the population; yet, many citizens have professed a willingness during wartime to sublimate their personal concerns for the sake of national loyalty. Perhaps opposition to the Vietnam war has been inspired less by the draft status of young males than by the social status of

voters who may hold different perceptions of "the public interest" or national obligations. While the probability of induction into military service has varied by social class, disapproval of American participation in the Vietnam war apparently was more closely related to socioeconomic attributes than to the potential threat of the draft.

IV. CORRELATES OF THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

To illustrate the major associations between ecological characteristics and voting behavior in the Vietnam referenda, 12 variables that were significantly related to the vote were chosen from an initial analysis of 198 attributes. The coefficients of correlation between selected socioeconomic and household characteristics and the vote against American participation in the Vietnam war are presented in Table 3.

The combined effects of the twelve variables as determined by multiple regression analysis seemed to be closely associated with referendum voting on Vietnam policy. The multiple correlation coefficients (R) ranged from .80 in San Francisco to .99 in Dearborn and Beverly Hills, indicating that the variables accounted for a sizeable amount of the variation (R^2) in the votes. Demographic characteristics, therefore, appeared to be strongly related to the vote on the Vietnam war.

The summary measures also revealed that median family income was inversely associated with opposition to the war, even in university centers such as Madison and Cambridge. In fact, some evidence indicated that the association between socioeconomic status and voting on the Vietnam issue in Cambridge and Madison may have reflected the unusual distribution of educational characteristics in these campus communities. When median education was employed as a control variable, the partial correlations between median income and the vote against the war increased to $-.58$ in Cambridge and to $-.87$ in Madison. The relationship between median family income and opposition to the war, therefore, seemed to broaden somewhat the scope of the finding that socioeconomic status was inversely related to the disapproval of American military activities in Vietnam.

Variables denoting the proportions of households that contained draft-age sons did not seem to be uniformly associated with opposition to the war, but the percentages of men aged 36 to 60 years were inversely related to the vote against the Vietnam war in all cities. In fact, the only variables that yielded consistent or unidirectional correlations in all communities were median family income, the percentage of owner

TABLE 3.
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TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC OR HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM WAR BY CENSUS TRACT IN FIVE CITIES, 1966-1968

	Dearborn (1966) (N = 18)	Dearborn (1968) (N = 18)	Beverly Hills (1968) (N = 5)	San Francisco (1967) (N = 122)	Madison (1968) (N = 27)	Cambridge (1967) (N = 30)
Median family income	-.79***	-.85***	-.64	-.41***	-.66***	-.33*
Median education	-.75***	-.78***	-.72	-.14	+.22	+.74***
Percent of population employed in white collar jobs	-.70***	-.81***	-.27	-.30***	-.03	+.72***
Percent of population unemployed	+.51*	+.40*	+.75	+.39***	+.44**	-.44**
Percent of owner occupied dwelling units	-.80***	-.67***	-.44	-.30***	-.70***	-.32*
Median value of dwelling unit	-.60**	-.74***	-.62	-.14	-.39*	+.72***
Median monthly rent	-.84***	-.85***	-.66	-.35***	-.39*	+.60***
Percent of population <u>nonwhite</u>	+.25	+.11	-.57	+.65***	+.21	+.15
Percent of population <u>foreign born</u>	+.81***	+.79***	+.98**	-.16	+.34*	-.67***
Percent of households containing children under 18 years of age	-.60**	-.56**	-.33	+.22**	-.77***	-.63***
Percent of males aged 15-24 years	+.23	+.23	-.84*	+.12	+.76***	+.21
Percent of males aged 35-60 years	-.71***	-.76***	-.67	-.09	-.54**	-.37*
Multiple R	.99	.99	.99	.80	.98	.96
Multiple R ²	.99	.99	.99	.65	.96	.93

* significant at the .05 level

** significant at the .01 level

*** significant at the .001 level

occupied dwelling units, and the proportion of men between 35 and 60 years of age. Each of those characteristics was inversely related to opposition to the war in all six referenda.

This finding raised the disquieting possibility that the association between age and the vote on the Vietnam issue, instead of indicating the concern of fathers for the safety of their sons, actually may have signified generational conflict or the hostility of middle-aged voters toward youthful anti-war protestors. Perhaps many middle-aged parents endorsed existing Vietnam policy in the referenda as a reflection of their faith and confidence in the country or as an expression of their disapproval of student demonstrations to end American involvement in the Vietnam war. Contrasting perceptions of the war and the national interest may have represented generational as well socioeconomic differences. Since popular speculation has emphasized the disagreements between young people and the

older generation over the Vietnam issue, this interpretation seemed to require further examination.

V. AGE AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Since increasing social status and advancing age usually have been highly inter-related, median family income was used as a control variable in the computation of partial coefficients of correlation between several demographic characteristics and the vote against the Vietnam war in four cities.⁴³ The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.

The partial correlations suggested that income

⁴³ Due to limitations on degrees of freedom in some cities, only first-order partial correlations were used in this study. Missing data for some variables also necessitated the elimination of Beverly Hills from this analysis.

SOECONOMIC OR
ATION
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Madison (1968) N = 27)	Cambridge (1967) (N = 30)
+ .56*	+ .77***
+ .19	+ .76***
- .12	- .47**
+ .00	+ .02
+ .20	+ .79***
+ .56*	+ .74***
+ .13	+ .18
- .42	- .75***
+ .00	- .52**
+ .59*	+ .16
- .34	- .35*

the proportion of men
age, for example, re-
ported; it was diminished
in Madison; and in
the two Dearborn
cities, the partial corre-
lation between the war and median
income and the percentage of
voters of age, were only
marginally consistent
with the following inverse
relationships: Dearborn
North, -.57; Dearborn
South, -.51; Cambridge,
-.42. The partial correla-
tion between voter preferences
on the Vietnam issue may have been
affected by generational
divisions within

DISCUSSION

Referenda on the Vi-
etnam war were strongly associated
with social and economic charac-
teristics. In fact, a mul-
tivariate analysis indicated that twelve
attributes acting to-
gether accounted for the amount of vari-
ation in the interesting differ-
ences in associations be-

tween specific variables and public support or
opposition concerning American involvement in
the Vietnam war.

Although voting patterns in municipal refer-
enda on the Vietnam issue may have been af-
fected by the social structure of the entire com-
munity as well as by local traditions and rival-
ries, the data generally indicated that opposition
to the war was associated with working-class
rather than middle- or upper-income attributes.
In most of the referenda, the vote to end U. S.
participation in the Vietnam war was directly
related to relatively low income, education, oc-
cupational status, home ownership, house values,
and monthly rent, while relatively high positions
on those measures were associated with the en-
dorsement of existing policies in Vietnam. In
part, this finding may have reflected the special
burdens that wars have imposed on lower-class
voters.

In addition, opposition to U. S. military inter-
vention in Vietnam was inversely related to me-
dian income in each of the cities. Partial correla-
tions, employing median family income as a con-
trol variable, seemed to underscore the impor-
tance of socioeconomic influences on the vote in
Vietnam referenda. The associations between
protest voting and the proportion of middle-
aged men as well as other age groups seldom re-
mained consistent or significant when the impact
of income was excluded, but partial correlations
between income and opposition to the war were
uniformly inverse and statistically significant in
four referenda with the effects of middle age re-
moved. Opposition to American participation
in the Vietnam war, therefore, seemed to be re-
flected more by social and economic distinctions
than by the disagreements that have divided
young people and their elders.

Perhaps attitudes about war have been shaped
by the simple fact that most members of the
public, and especially working-class voters, sel-
dom have been given an opportunity to exert a
direct influence on foreign policy decisions. For
very small sectors of the population, the chance
to express personal convictions about the Viet-
nam war has been available through picketing
and mass protests; but it has been difficult to
determine whether or not the demonstrations
accurately reflected popular sentiments about
the issue. The relatively remote nature of for-
eign policy questions has seemed to greatly
complicate the search for correlates of public
opinion regarding war.

The national survey, which reported that so-
cial and economic characteristics were not re-
lated to attitudes toward the war, for example,
also disclosed that the opinions about the Viet-

nam war held by informed and articulate re-
spondents did not differ appreciably from the
views expressed by persons who lacked those
characteristics.⁴⁴ Subsequent analysis of a sur-
vey of Detroit adults, however, revealed that
the greatest desire to vote in a referendum on
Vietnam policy was centered among persons who
displayed a low sense of political efficacy but
who were highly interested in world problems;
those respondents also expressed the strongest
support for a de-escalation of the Vietnam
war.⁴⁵

Since feelings of political ineffectiveness have
been most prevalent among relatively low-status
voters,⁴⁶ perhaps a tendency to defer to the
statements of supposedly expert national leaders
and the lack of a strong sense of efficacy pro-
moted the common perceptions of working class
"hawkishness" during the Vietnam controversy.
Increased opportunities for the public to vote
directly on issues of war and peace, therefore,
conceivably could have revealed a slightly al-
tered distribution of popular sentiments about
the Vietnam issue.

The inverse association between increasing so-
cioeconomic status and opposition to the Viet-
nam war found in most communities seemed to
suggest some important qualifications of existing
speculation about public attitudes on political is-
sues. The tendency of lower class voters to favor
a conciliatory rather than a militaristic solution
to the Vietnam conflict, for example, did not
seem to be consistent with the notion of "work-
ing class authoritarianism."⁴⁷ One researcher
even has suggested that the findings of recent
studies of attitudes regarding war may indicate
the presence of a characteristic "which, at least
with respect to this kind of foreign policy con-
cern, we might label as 'upper middle class
authoritarianism.'"⁴⁸

The results of this investigation, however, did
not seem to contradict speculation about the
concept of an upper-class "Yankee-Protestant"⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Verba, et al., "Public Opinion and the War in
Vietnam," 326-330.

⁴⁵ Harlan Hahn, "Political Efficacy and Foreign
Policy Attitudes," *Social Problems*, 17 (Fall 1969),
271-279.

⁴⁶ See Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation*
(Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1965), pp. 56-58.

⁴⁷ Seymour M. Lipset, "Democracy and Working-
Class Authoritarianism," *American Sociological Re-
view*, 24 (August 1959), 482-502.

⁴⁸ Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Sup-
port for 'Tough' Military Initiatives," 442.

⁴⁹ Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, pp. 9-10.

* as in SVR (Russia)

or "public-regarding"⁵⁰ ethos that usually has implied support for public policies or referendum measures that are sanctioned by "the public interest" or by "the welfare of the community." As a collective action that often has been justified as necessary for the protection or preservation of the entire society, the endorsement of national participation in a major war seemed to be consistent with the political ethos of relatively high-status segments of the community. On the other hand, working-class residents probably have tended to adopt political positions on the basis of personal or family considerations. Among lower-class voters, who have been inclined to interpret political controversies in terms of simple or immediate needs and obligations, perhaps attitudes concerning war have been shaped less by the perceived interests of the entire country than by the potential loss of

⁵⁰ Wilson and Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," 876-887.

young lives.⁵¹

⁵¹ Impressionistic, unstructured interviewing conducted after the first vote on the Vietnam war in Dearborn, Michigan, in fact, suggested a sharp distinction between the "ideological" reactions to the referendum issue that were elicited in relatively affluent sections of the community and the highly "personal" responses that emerged in working-class neighborhoods where the proposal to withdraw American troops from Vietnam received a clear majority. While many high-status voters evaluated the controversy as a necessary defense against the global threat of Communist expansion or as an unwarranted intervention in a civil war, most working-class residents responded to the war as a tangible and direct threat to the lives of American men. Since their interpretation of the war was confined to the death and injury that it implied, the perspectives of working-class voters left them with few alternatives except to oppose the war. See Hahn and Sugarman, "A Referendum on Vietnam," 14-15.

Or: do they perceive it in their (elite)
interest? (Chosky)

(Right wing backlash - McCain -
was from right-wingers - high-income!)

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